Learning lessons and moving forward: how to reduce financial barriers to obstetric care in low-income contexts by Witter, Sophie et al.
 Studies in HSO&P, 24, 2008 277 
Learning lessons and moving forward: how to reduce 
financial barriers to obstetric care in low-income 
contexts 
 
Sophie Witter1, Fabienne Richard2 & Vincent De Brouwere2,3 
 
Introduction: typology of interventions 
In all of the contexts described in this book, the problem statement is the 
same - few women are accessing formal delivery services, for reasons which 
include their inability to afford the cost of care. Skilled attendance rates, 
nationally, range from around one-third in the case study countries with the 
highest proportion living in absolute poverty to two-thirds in those with the 
lowest levels (Table 1). All, apart from Bolivia, have caesarean section rates 
that fall far below the recommended range of 5%-15% of deliveries (and in 
Bolivia, the low rural rates are counterbalanced by excessive urban one). 
The financial barriers that they face stem from a range of factors, 
including low household incomes, low prioritisation of maternal health 
within the household, high costs of care, unpredictability of costs of care, 
and lack of risk-sharing mechanisms within the health financing system (so 
that the majority of costs are paid out-of-pocket by households). The 
financial and non-financial barriers result in low demand for obstetric care 
and low effective access. Although interconnected, some of these barriers are 
addressed more directly through health system interventions and others 
through household and community interventions (Figure 1). 
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Table 1. Selected characteristics of cases study countries 
C-section rate (DHS) Country GNI per 
capita in 
current 
US$ 
(2007) 
National 
skilled 
atten-
dance 
coverage 
(DHS) 
 
Total 
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
Out of 
pocket as 
% of total 
expendi-
ture on 
health 
(2007) 
% 
popula-
tion 
below 
1.25 
US$ per 
day 
 
Bolivia 1,260 67% 
(2003) 
15.8  23.0 6.1 32%  19.6% 
(2005) 
Burkina Faso 430 38% 
(2003) 
0.7 
 
2.6 0.4 44%  56.5% 
(2003) 
Cambodia 540 44% 
(2005) 
2.2  6.7 1.4 63%  40.2% 
(2004) 
Ghana 590 47% 
(2003) 
4.2 8.9 1.8 45%  30.0% 
(2005) 
Guinea 400 38% 
(2005) 
1.8 
 
5.2 0.8 88%  70.1% 
(2003) 
India 
 
950 47% 
(2005-
2006) 
9  17.3 6.2 78%  Rural 
43.8% 
(2004) 
Urban 
36.2% 
(2004) 
Mauritania 840 57% 
(2000-
2001) 
3.3  5.6 1.5 31%  21.2% 
(2000) 
Senegal 820  52% 
(2005) 
3.5  7.1 1.4 56%  33.5% 
(2005) 
Sources: World Bank (key development data & statistics), Countdown 2015 (Country 
profiles), DHS Stat Compiler  
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Figure 1. Barriers for households to accessing obstetric care (source Witter 2008a) 
 
 
 
 
The interventions described in this book aim to lower access barriers by 
averting some of the economic and social costs of paying for obstetric care 
which are described in the context chapter (Borghi et al. 2008). Cost 
structures vary according to context, with facility costs dominating in some 
contexts and non-facility costs (for example, for transport) dominating in 
others. The costs of obstetric care take many forms and are not just focussed 
on the intrapartum period, but can also last for some time after the delivery, 
particularly in the event of an obstetric emergency or near-miss event 
(Storeng et al. 2007). 
Most of the approaches described in this book focus on the cost of care 
and on increasing risk-pooling of costs. They mostly adopt one or more of 
the direct strategies to reduce financial barriers to care described in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Direct strategies to reduce financial barriers - an overview 
Strategy Funding  Targeting Which 
costs? 
Purchasing Payment systems 
Supply side (financial barriers tackled via the health system) 
Fee exemption or 
reduction (Ghana, 
Senegal, Burkina) 
Service-based; 
possible 
geographic 
targeting and self-
selection 
Subsidies on inputs 
or retrospec-tive 
payment per case to 
facilities 
Waivers (Cambodia 
HEF) 
Public 
finance or 
donors 
 
Individual or 
household 
targeting 
Payments per case or 
per capita to 
facilities 
Tackling informal 
payments 
(Mauritania) 
User fees, 
with 
possible 
subsidy 
component 
All services within 
specific facilities 
or facility types 
Official fees 
for services 
and goods 
 
Health 
facilities - 
public, 
private, 
private not-
for-profit 
  
Internal to facility 
budget: substitution 
of official for 
unofficial payments 
Demand side (financial barriers tackled directly via the households) 
Conditional cash 
transfers 
(India) 
Public 
finance or 
donors 
Individual or 
household 
targeting 
Any cost 
compon-ent, 
potentially - 
fees, 
transport, 
food, 
opportunity 
costs 
Payment to client, 
subject to specified 
attendance at 
facilities 
Vouchers (Cambodia) Public 
finance or 
donors, 
with 
possible co-
payments 
Individual or 
household 
targeting, usually, 
though could be 
geographic 
Official fees 
for services 
and goods 
Payment per case to 
facilities in exchange 
for redeemed 
vouchers 
Loans Public 
finance, 
donors, 
community 
contribu-
tions 
Individual and 
needs-based 
(sometimes based 
on 
creditworthiness 
too) 
May be 
restricted to 
certain costs 
or 
situations, 
or general 
Loans to clients with 
or without fixed 
limits and interest 
Prepayment/ 
community health 
insurance (Guinea, 
Mauritania)/social 
heath insurance 
(Bolivia) 
Public 
finance or 
donors, 
with 
possible co-
payments 
Individual or 
household 
targeting, usually, 
though could be 
geographic 
Official fees 
for services 
and goods 
Usually 
third party 
organisation, 
based in 
community, 
or at facility, 
or indepen-
dent (but 
generally 
not-for-
profit) 
 
Subsidy payment to 
insurance fund per 
target client enrolled  
Source: adapted from (Witter 2008b) 
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In addition to direct approaches to reducing financial barriers, there are 
a variety of actions which, while not usually framed in those terms, do in 
reality bring down the real costs of accessing services for clients. These 
include, for example: 
• Changes to public resource collection and allocation in such a way that 
poorer areas benefit and are able to pass on the benefits in the form of 
fee reductions or quality improvements. 
• Any policy which increases the income of clients, particularly the poor, 
will have the effect of reducing the real cost of accessing care (e.g. micro-
credits). 
• Bringing services closer to clients, which has the effect of reducing 
transport and opportunity costs (e.g. increase the number of CEmOC 
facilities or/and provision of funded ambulance service). 
• Improving the quality of care and the provision of drugs and supplies 
similarly reduces real costs to clients, by removing the need to seek 
alternative sources of care (e.g. in the private sector) and to purchase 
additional inputs, such as drugs and supplies, which are lacking in 
facilities. 
Lessons derived from case studies 
A summary of the policies described in this book and their impact is given in 
Appendix 1.  
Senegal and Ghana present examples of national fee exemption policies, 
which have achieved positive results at relatively low costs per case, but with 
significant implementation difficulties. These included inadequate funding 
in Ghana and failure to adequately reimburse lower level facilities in 
Senegal, both of which reduced the real benefits which were realised for 
households (Witter et al. 2008c). These policies were wide but thin: 
entitlement was universal, with rapid scale up from poorer regions, but with 
theoretical cost reductions limited to service fees, while the bulk of 
household expenses go to drug costs and transport. Community health 
insurance (CHI) could play a complementary role by taking on these costs 
not covered by the national fee exemption policy. However coverage of CHI 
remains low and access is not guaranteed if households cannot afford the 
premium (Soors et al. 2008). In Guinea, a CHI was developed specifically to 
protect women and their families from excessive expenditures (Ndiaye et al. 
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2008). This system, called MURIGA, is progressively scaling up in terms of 
district coverage but the the proportion of adherents remains low, as is 
common for more general CHI. 
In Mauritania, household solidarity is expressed by a flat fee pre-payment 
scheme. This prepayment is offered to pregnant women at the first antenatal 
consultation and covers all costs until the end of the pregnancy. The state 
pays salaries to the health personnel involved in the obstetric care and the 
pre-payment covers consumables and fees. This is a district-managed scheme 
(Renaudin et al. 2008). The Burkina initiative in Secteur 30 includes all care 
for the mother and her newborn (transport, intervention and post-delivery 
care) but is limited to emergency and/or life-threatening obstetric care. This 
scheme involves not only the district, the households and the health centres, 
but also the local authorities. This system is district-driven and cannot be 
implemented without the willingness of the district team and local authority 
(Ouédraogo et al. 2008).  
Other approaches target the poorest pregnant women. In Cambodia, a 
voucher system and a Health Equity Fund (HEF) were implemented with the 
specific aim of protecting the poorest. The number of voucher and HEF 
beneficiaries represented a large share (32.5%) of total reported facility 
deliveries and increased sharply over time. But the study questions the 
effectiveness of the targeting (Por et al. 2008). In India, the government 
introduced a conditional cash assistance programme called the Janani 
Suruksha Yojana (JSY) in 2005 to promote institutional deliveries. Under 
this programme, poor women who attended three antenatal clinics and who 
delivered in a health facility were to be given money soon after delivery to 
take care of their direct and indirect costs (Devadasan et al. 2008). Process 
evaluation shows the difficulty of assuring efficient and transparent cash 
transfers in a policy of this ambitious scale.  
In the case of Bolivia, a variety of packages for free care have been 
developed over the past decade, promoting access for priority groups such as 
mothers and children. Although these are called social health insurance, they 
are funded not by membership but by national and local revenues, and to 
that extent are similar to the national exemption policies. A significant and 
sustained increase in access has been achieved, but overall coverage of 
services remains low and indicators for rural areas still lag far behind those of 
urban areas (Pooley et al. 2008). 
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There are a number of lessons which emerge from these case studies. 
One is the importance of setting out a clear monitoring and evaluation 
framework for new policies. Given the frailty of funding for many of these 
policies, robust evidence of results is needed to justify further external 
investment. It is also important to look at beneficiary incidence - how much 
of the subsidies are reaching the poorer households. Few schemes do this at 
present (only Ghana out of the case studies in this book).  
The need for clear implementation plans and guidelines also emerges for 
some of these initiatives. Differences have been observed in terms of 
implementation that can lead to a complete distortion of the objectives of 
the plan (for example, in India, where some areas decided to reimburse 
home deliveries). This has also been noted in similar policies elsewhere 
(Powell-Jackson et al. 2007). 
Funding sources vary greatly between schemes - some rely fully on 
national government funding (Ghana, Senegal, India); some are fully funded 
by donors (Cambodia); some are mainly funded by users (Mauritania); and 
others have a mix of sources (three levels of government in Bolivia; a mix of 
users, local government and national in Burkina). Many had considerable 
assistance with set-up costs from donors (Mauritania and Guinea). Funding 
sources correlate to some extent with the scale of the policy: those funded by 
government are much more likely to be national in scale, compared to other 
sources. They are also most plagued by funding delays. 
The low take-up of some of the benefits packages - even where these are 
substantial and do not require co-payments by households - merits further 
investigation. In the Cambodia voucher scheme, less than half of the eligible 
women used their vouchers for delivery care. In Guinea, a 10% take-up rate 
was reported, despite the high external subsidy and potentially large cost-
savings for households. These imply non-financial barriers, such as concerns 
over quality of care or geographical and cultural barriers. 
A theme shared by most of the studies is the dissatisfaction of health 
workers with rising workloads and the lack of income supplements (with the 
exception of Mauritania) - though in some (such as India) informal payments 
may be filling the gap. To ensure the sustainability of the policy and to 
minimise adverse effects, this constituency should be won over in reforms to 
user payments. This is likely to involve a mixture of measures, including 
consultation over changes, improvements to pay and working conditions, 
and ensuring adequate staffing and controls over working hours. 
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All schemes report increased uptake of services, though few have robust 
evidence of the extent of the increase (see Table 3). Costs of intervention are 
equally under-reported, but where this information is available, the estimates 
are fairly close (for example, $18-$21 per normal deliveries and $154-$165 
per CS). These costs do mask differences in benefit packages though.  
 
Table 3. Summary of costs and utilisation responses 
Obstetric finance scheme Cost of intervention Impact on utilisation 
Bolivia social health insurance Not reported 17% increase in supervised deliveries at 
national level over period 1994-2003, 
partly related to SUMI.  
5% increase in CS over same period 
(though no change in rural areas). 
Burkina cost sharing Estimated $165 per CS 20.3% increase in supervised deliveries 
between 2003 and 2007 (secteur 30 
district) 
1.2% increase in CS  
Cambodia vouchers $5 per voucher 
recipient 
$18 per supported 
delivery 
12.3% increase in public health facility 
deliveries (2006-2007- 
( increase of vouchers deliveries as well as 
self paid deliveries) 
Ghana fee exemption $22 per delivery (all 
types) 
$0.16 per capita 
(nationally) 
$62 per additional 
delivery (all types) 
12% increase in supervised delivery rate 
(2003-2005, Central Region) 
5% increase (2004-2005, Volta Region) 
India cash transfer Not reported Between 15 and 27% increase 
(depending on the areas) in facility 
deliveries (2004-2006) 
Mauritania EmOC insurance Set-up costs of $1.3 to 
$4 per reproductive age 
woman 
Premium of $22 per 
pregnancy 
33. 8% increase in facility deliveries 
(2000-2007) 
Muriga CHI, Guinea Not reported Little impact on supervised deliveries : 
5% increase from 2000 to 2006 
1.1% increase in CS (not different from 
non-Muriga areas) 
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Senegal fee exemption $2.2 per normal 
delivery 
$154 per CS 
$0.10 per capita 
nationally 
$21 per additional 
normal delivery 
$467 per additional CS 
Based on sample of facilities in five 
exempted regions (2004-6): 
4% increase supervised deliveries 
1.4% increase in CS rate  
 
Most of the policies described here were young, and so the impact on 
more ‘fixed’ costs, such as staff, equipment and maintenance were not 
significant, but over time, as activity levels increase, governments must 
budget for increased allocations to these areas.  
There is a clear trade-off between depth and breadth, with targeted 
schemes (Cambodia, India) able to include a wider range of costs, such as 
access costs. However, the assumed equity advantages of individual targeting 
over geographical targeting was questioned by the Cambodia case study, 
which highlighted the problem of maintaining systems for identifying the 
poor in all villages. 
Some of the initiatives had very short lifetimes, being soon superseded, 
fully or partially, by new policy initiatives (e.g. in Ghana, by the shift from 
exemptions to national insurance, or in Burkina Faso, by the shift from 
localised cost-sharing to a national subsidy policy). These policy shifts can be 
positive, if they represent scaling up of policies and are based on lessons 
learned from previous experiences.  
The only case study with a longer history (of more than a decade) is the 
Bolivian one. It demonstrates the possibility of improving national indicators 
with sustained national commitment over time, but also issues of cost-
control, and the limit to policies which target financial barriers alone, 
without addressing wider health system, geographical and cultural barriers.  
The case studies highlight a range of practical lessons on the 
implementation of policies aimed at reducing financial barriers to obstetric 
care. These are summarised in Box 1. 
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Box 1. Lessons on implementation of policies to reduce financial barriers to 
obstetric care 
1. Design of policy 
• The policy should be based on a thorough situation analysis of the main barriers 
to raising skilled delivery (financial barriers may not be the most significant 
factor in some contexts). Policies directly addressing financial barriers are most 
appropriate where there is: 
o High maternal mortality (and/or high inequalities in maternal 
mortality rates by area or socio-economic group) 
o Relatively low skilled attendance rate at delivery (and/or high 
inequalities in skilled attendance at delivery rates by area or socio-
economic group) 
o Low caesarean rates (below 5% of all deliveries) and/or high 
inequalities in CS rates by area or socio-economic group 
o Physical access by population to health care facilities 
o Staffing of health facilities with at least minimum norms of trained 
personnel  
o Acceptable quality of care, with functioning equipment and adequate 
drug supply 
o High out-of-pocket payments by households for delivery care, relative to 
household income 
• The package of services to be covered should address the policy’s objectives (e.g. 
including the interventions which save lives and cause most economic hardship 
to families) 
• The policy should be consistent with the wider policy environment and thinking 
in government 
• The policy should extend to major service providers, whatever their sector of 
work, reflecting current utilisation patterns of services and subject to minimum 
quality standards 
• Eligibility should reflect areas of greatest need but also a realistic assessment of 
available resources 
• Additional investments should be planned alongside the policy to address key 
supply-side constraints (such as staff shortages) and to cope with increased 
utilisation in the medium-term 
• The scope for additional demand-side investments, such as in transport funds, 
should be considered alongside supply-side approaches, in specific areas of need 
• The role of complementary players, such as TBAs, should be considered - can 
they be involved in the policy in a constructive way? 
• Policies should reinforce the referral process, so that uncomplicated deliveries 
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are handled at lower level facilities  
• Conversely, the policy should support access to referral care for those with 
medical needs 
2. Policy development process 
• All key stakeholders should be consulted and involved in development of the 
policy. This process should engage with potential ‘champions’, who can sustain 
the policy momentum nationally and sell the policy politically 
• The policy should be carefully and realistically costed (based on utilisation 
patterns, caseload, unit costs, and projected changes to these) and matched with 
likely funding sources (also projected to assess likely changes over the medium-
term) 
• Policy guidelines should be clearly elaborated and communicated to all key 
stakeholders 
• Policy should be subject to periodic review and revision with major stakeholders 
3. Policy dissemination 
• Core messages should be kept as simple as possible 
• Strategy should be developed for active dissemination of policy to communities 
and health workers 
• Statements of benefits package and eligibility criteria should be prominently 
displayed 
4. Resource allocation 
• Funds should be allocated by area according to a population-based formula, 
adjusted for service utilisation rates and case-mix 
• Other public funding sources should be maintained so that the policy provides 
additional resources 
• Funding should be regular and predictable 
5. Payment systems 
• The payment mechanism should ensure that average production costs (or the 
components that are not centrally funded or subsidised) are reimbursed (but not 
over-reimbursed) for each provider type 
• Payments to facilities should either be made in advance, based on predicted 
caseload, and adjusted periodically, based on reports, or paid retrospectively but 
frequently, to avoid cash-flow problems 
• If based on activities, there should be record-keeping which allows for 
independent verification of cases managed 
• Indicators of cost escalation, including caesarean rates, should be monitored, 
and incentives adjusted to counter-act over-medicalisation 
• The financial impact on health facilities should be monitored, with checks to 
ensure that costs are not being shifted onto other services, or into informal 
payments 
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• If health workers were dependent for part or whole of their income on user fees, 
then compensatory measures should be built into the policy 
6. Management, monitoring and evaluation 
• There should be clear lines of responsibility (both institutional and individual) 
for managing and monitoring the policy implementation process 
• Timely monitoring should pick up and respond to problems, but also flag up 
successes to generate continued financial support 
• Periodic community-based surveys should assess actual benefits to different socio-
economic and geographical groups 
• Evaluations should be conducted periodically, using baseline indicators of 
utilisation, quality of care, health outcomes and household costs 
• Country experiences should be documented and shared, focussing not only on 
costs and outcomes, but also on the processes which enabled policies to be 
sustained and to be effective, or conversely, which acted as barriers 
 
Is there a best bet strategy for different contexts? 
There is increasing recognition of the importance of context and process, 
which will determine the dynamic responses of health systems to changes. A 
three-country study of health reforms and maternal health (Penn-Kekana et 
al. 2007) found large differences between de jure systems (as laid out in 
official documents) and de facto systems (in terms of actual care). Informal 
behaviours, structures and relationships mediated the official policies in 
unintended ways which sometimes worked against their purpose. This limits 
the transferability of lessons (positive and negative) from one context to 
another.  
It is also widely recognised that there is no single successful way to 
‘target’ the poor (Gwatkin et al. 2005), and that many different approaches 
are required to re-orient health systems towards greater equity. A recent 
report for WHO included wide-ranging recommendations covering political 
and legal frameworks, regulatory measures, health financing and 
management initiatives (Gilson et al. 2007). Others go even broader, and 
emphasise that equity should involve addressing the root causes of poverty 
and inequity, not just addressing the symptoms: ‘ “Pro-poor” interventions 
deployed around a deeply inequitable core structure are insufficient’ (UN 
Millennium Project 2005). There is a growing view that health systems 
should not just seek to guarantee equitable access to interventions but 
 Studies in HSO&P, 24, 2008 289 
should be seen as a core social institution which reinforces social solidarity 
and citizenship. Conversely, exclusion and marginalising treatment by the 
health system is increasingly recognised as forming a core part of the 
experience of being poor in low-income countries (UN Millennium Project 
2005). The authors of this report argue for a paradigm shift away from the 
focus on competitive markets to deliver health care goods more efficiently to 
a human rights approach which recognises the role of the state in ensuring 
redistribution and social solidarity. This involves reinforcing the legitimacy 
of the state, strengthening collaborative relationships between public and 
private sectors, and giving the poor a stronger voice and power to assert 
claims. 
Financing increased coverage 
The overall financial climate remains highly constrained in low-income 
countries. Many countries spend less than $10 per capita per year on health 
care, which is well below the ballpark figure suggested by the Commission 
for Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) of $35-40 to finance a basic package 
of health in developing countries (World Health Organization 2001). Some 
are pessimistic about the likelihood of reaching that figure in the period to 
2015 (Pearson 2007). These projections suggest that health financing is likely 
to increase over the period to 2015, but will be lowest and starting from the 
lowest base in the poorest countries, and unlikely to reach CMH targets. 
Even if the Abuja targets for government allocations to health were met 
(15% of public expenditure allocated to health), there would continue to be 
significant shortfalls in funding, relative to the $35 per capita target. 
Consequently, this report argues, the focus should be on improving the use 
of such additional resources as are realistically to be expected. 
A recent modelling exercise of the additional resources required to reach 
the MDG goals for maternal and newborn health in 75 countries produced 
estimates of $39 billion over the next ten years to achieve moderate scale up, 
and $56 billion for a more rapid scale up (Johns et al. 2007). Mobilising 
these resources will be challenging, despite recent initiatives, such as the 
Global Business Plan for MDGs 4 and 5 and the International Health 
Partnership. Estimates of the cost of reaching MDG 5 in high-burden 
countries range from $0.22 per head to $1.40 (Gill et al. 2007). Based on 
2004 levels, donor funding would have to increase 11-fold to achieve the 
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investment which the WHO estimates is needed by 2015 (Borghi et al. 2006; 
Powell-Jackson et al. 2006). A recent review of donor funding found that 
funding for maternal and neonatal health had increased between 2003 and 
2006 from $7 per live birth to $12 per live birth (Greco et al. 2008). 
However, the authors noted that funding has reduced in some high-burden 
countries and that resources were not well targeted to areas of highest 
maternal health need. 
Maternal health is also in competition for resources with other health 
goals, and has traditionally attracted fewer resources than the more ‘vertical’ 
interventions, though this is something that the recent initiatives aim to 
address. The relatively modest cost of providing free mother and child care 
in countries like South Africa - 2.5% of the recurrent budget (Schneider & 
Gilson 1999) - suggest that resources for this strand could be found at the 
national level, if this was seen as a priority intervention by policy-makers. 
Recent initiatives, such as the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child 
Health have attempted to act as advocates for MCH and to create 
harmonised messages - one of the weaknesses identified by some observers of 
the Safe Motherhood movement (AbouZahr 2001, Shiffman & Smith 2007).  
International financial support is currently being pulled in two 
directions. One is towards strengthening health systems, with the 
recognition that high levels of funding tied to specific diseases can weaken 
the sector as a whole. For example, a recent report found that only about 
20% of all health aid goes to support the government’s overall programme 
(i.e. is given as general budget or sector support), while an estimated 50% of 
health aid is off budget (Foster 2005). On the other hand, there is a shift 
towards output-based aid, in which aid is dependent on specified targets 
being met (World Bank 2007). Depending on how, by whom and which 
targets are set, these approaches may or may not reinforce one another.  
Conclusion 
There is renewed interest in closing the gap in skilled attendance and 
maternal health, between and within countries, and a variety of approaches 
have been tested in recent years in different contexts. In addition to policies 
which directly address the financial barriers for households, which are the 
focus of this volume, there is also a growing interest in complementary areas, 
such as getting the right incentives for health workers to increase coverage 
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and creating aid modalities which enable and reward higher performance by 
the health system as a whole. These approaches can all contribute, if 
designed in an integrated way, to meeting the MDG goals. 
Adopting the right package for a given context is not a mechanistic 
matter. The balance of supply- and demand-side constraints will vary, and the 
design of an appropriate policy has to take into account resource availability, 
cultural expectations of roles and responsibilities, as well as the way in which 
the health service is financed and organised.  
There are no single ‘best bet’ strategies for all contexts, but there are 
established pathways to success, derived from country experiences. The key 
ingredients are local commitment, perseverance over time, a holistic 
approach which addresses demand- and supply-side barriers, and maintaining 
a focus on universal coverage as the ultimate, if not immediate, goal. 
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Appendix 1. Summary of case studies 
 Ghana delivery fee exemption policy Senegal free delivery and caesarean policy 
Design features 
Date and 
geographic 
extent of 
implementati
on 
End 2003 introduced for four poor 
regions; end 2004 scaled up to whole 
country 
2005 introduced for five poorer regions; extended 
in 2006 to all regional hospitals (except Dakar) 
Beneficiaries All women who deliver in health 
facilities  
All women who have caesareans; all normal 
deliveries in health centres and health posts 
What services 
are covered 
by the 
scheme?  
All normal deliveries; all assisted 
deliveries (including CS); all 
complications arising from deliveries. 
All direct facility costs for the mother 
are meant to be covered 
(consultation, tests, drugs, supplies 
etc.). 
Normal deliveries and caesareans (now extending 
to other complicated deliveries). All direct facility 
costs for the mother are meant to be covered 
(consultation, tests, drugs, supplies etc.). 
Which 
providers are 
eligible to 
participate? 
Public, mission and private providers 
are eligible 
Public only 
Funding 
arrangements 
Funded by government, with inputs 
from HIPC funds 
Funded by government 
Management 
of the 
scheme 
Funds transferred to districts, based 
on population numbers. Funds 
managed by District Assemblies and 
District Health team.  
Coordinating committee at national level. 
Operates through regions and districts, working 
with national and regional medical stores for 
provision of kits. 
System for 
paying 
providers 
Facilities present monthly reports on 
exemptions provided. Reimbursed 
according to agreed tariffs (according 
to acts and provider type) 
Funds transferred at start of year, based on 
estimated case-load, to regional hospitals; lower 
facilities receive kits for CS or normal deliveries 
Assessment of impact 
Impact on 
utilisation 
Estimated 12% increase in deliveries 
in Central Region (over 18 months of 
implementation) and 5% in Volta (6 
months of implementation). Main 
increase in health centres. Main 
attendance: by midwives. 
Data from selected facilities visited by researchers 
showed small but significant increases in facility 
deliveries (4%) and CS (1.4%) in year after 
introduction. Control data lacking but some 
national data for non-intervention regions 
supports claim that increase in five regions may be 
linked to intervention. 
Impact on 
quality of 
care 
Quality unchanged by scheme (poor 
before and after) 
Small but non-significant reduction in fresh 
stillbirths. Qualitative results suggest quality 
unchanged – neither deteriorated nor guaranteed 
by exemptions policy. 
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Impact on 
household 
costs/expend
itures 
Significant fall for fees for CS (28% 
decrease) and facility deliveries 
(26%); also non-significant fall for 
TBA/home deliveries (14%). Out of 
pocket payments remain significant 
however (continued non-fee and fee 
expenses) 
Qualitative evidence that households continuing 
to pay for many delivery costs at facilities, 
especially drugs not included in kits. Reduction in 
costs unlikely to be sufficient to convert non-
users, except for CS, where reductions probably 
more significant (though regional variations). 
Other complications not included in policy. 
Impact on 
health 
outcomes 
Not established, though mortality and morbidity should be reduced through increased 
facility deliveries and quicker access to emergency care  
Impact on 
facilities 
Initially positive – increased income 
and ability to purchase supplies – but 
later debts as scheme under-funded 
Value of transfers to regional hospitals far 
exceeded cost of services. Lower level facilities lost 
out though, due to kits not covering labour and 
other costs. Also shortages of kits and irregular 
supply. Some have recouped through increases in 
other prices or continued charging for deliveries. 
Impact on 
health 
workers 
No direct impact on health worker 
income, though workloads increase. 
Few incentives related to scheme. 
Health worker income going up 
independently at time of 
implementation. 
Policy threatens income of community staff at 
district and sub-district facilities (previously paid 
from delivery user fees). However, no evidence of 
cuts to staff – rather facilities now support in 
other ways. Increase in workload. Most deliveries 
conducted by ‘matrones’ (community staff with 3-
6 months’ training). 
Scheme’s 
performance 
in terms of 
equity 
Decrease in inequalities of utilisation 
by quintiles under policy in Volta 
(unchanged in Central). Fall in 
catastrophic payments and household 
pushed into poverty. Proportionate 
reduction in out-of-pocket greatest for 
top quintile (22%), compared to 
bottom (13%). 
Geographic inequity in distribution of funds and 
kits (poorly correlated with expected deliveries by 
region or district). Qualitative evidence that 
remote communities not able to access 
exemptions as too far from facilities. Main 
beneficiaries probably poor in urban/peri-urban 
areas. Poorest probably unaffected as limited 
waivers (e.g. free drugs) existed before. 
Adequacy 
and 
sustainability 
of funding 
Scheme funded almost adequate for 
first phase with four regions, but 
under-funded by 62% when 
expanded nationally. Lack of 
commitment. Poor monitoring and 
evaluation. Exemptions to be 
subsumed within new National 
Health Insurance Scheme 
Initial budget adequate but hampered by poor 
planning of policy implementation (e.g. transfers 
to lower facilities) and poor communication. Lack 
of consensus on policy approach undermined 
sustainability.  
Cost/cost-
effectiveness 
of the 
scheme 
$3 million total expenditure 2005. 
Average $22 per delivery. $0.16 per 
capita. $62 per additional delivery (all 
types) 
$300,000 spent on policy in 2005 for five regions 
(0.5% of total national health expenditure for 
year). $0.10 per capita. $2.2 average per normal 
delivery. $154 average per CS. $21 per additional 
normal delivery. $467 per additional CS. 
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Improving access to safe delivery, Kampong Cham, Cambodia 
 Vouchers Health Equity Funds (HEF) 
Design features 
Date and 
geographic 
extent of 
implementati
on 
The first scheme started in February 
2007 in one health district (Kampong 
Cham) and extended to two other 
health districts (Prey Chhor, 
Chamkar Leu) in mid- 2007 
Progressively started in late 2005 in 3 district 
hospitals and one provincial hospital 
Beneficiaries Poor pregnant women in the coverage 
area 
All poor patients admitted in the four 
government hospitals, including voucher 
recipients 
What 
services are 
covered by 
the scheme?  
User fees for delivery, 3 ANC visits 
and one postnatal care visit in 
contracted health centres; 
transportation cost between home 
and health centre to get the above 
services; cost for referral to hospital in 
case of complication  
Depending on eligibility level, total or part 
of the following benefit: hospital user fees, 
transportation cost, food allowance and 
funeral cost in case of death  
Which 
providers are 
eligible to 
participate? 
30 government health centres in the 3 
districts selected based on having: full 
Minimum Package of Activities, at 
least one skilled midwife, record of 
good performance in delivery and 
ANC  
4 contracted government hospitals 
Funding 
arrange-
ments 
Voucher and HEF schemes are funded by a bilateral project between Cambodian 
government and Belgian government  
Management 
of the 
scheme 
2 NGOs as both Voucher Management Agencies (VMA) and HEF operators 
System for 
paying 
providers 
Case-based payment: by the end of each month the health centres and hospitals get 
their services paid according to the number of vouchers and HEF cases and agreed 
tariffs of user fees 
Assessment of impact 
Impact on 
utilisation 
Deliveries in contracted health 
centres increased considerably; 
voucher supported 21.5% of the total 
health centre deliveries.  
However, more than one half of 
voucher recipients did not use their 
vouchers for delivery at contracted 
health centres 
Deliveries in contracted hospitals increased 
considerably; HEF supported 57.5% of the 
total hospital deliveries, including voucher 
recipients 
Impact on 
quality of 
care 
Not established, though it was reported to be improved 
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Impact on 
household 
costs/ 
expenditures 
Not established, though household costs/expenditures should be reduced as they 
could get the services for free  
Impact on 
health 
outcomes 
Not established, though maternal and child mortality and morbidity should be 
reduced through increased access to safe delivery: skilled birth attendance at public 
health facilities with quicker access to emergency care  
Impact on 
facilities 
Not established, though in general positive: increased income and better management 
Impact on 
health 
workers 
Not established, though it was reported that health workers were more regularly 
present at work thanks to increased income and better regulations through contracts 
and monitoring and supervision 
Scheme’s 
performance 
in terms of 
equity 
Not established, though equity should be promoted through targeting poor pregnant 
women. A large number of poor pregnant women was covered by the schemes  
Adequacy 
and 
sustainability 
of funding 
The present funding is very reliable. But external fund may not be sustainable. 
Anyhow, government budget is allocated for HEF. A plan supported by government to 
extend the vouchers to four other provinces is under process. This increases chances 
of sustainability of the schemes  
Cost/cost-
effectiveness 
of the 
scheme 
US$5,309 total expenditure in 2007. 
Average about US$5 per voucher 
recipient and US$18 per supported 
delivery 
Not established 
 
 Cost-sharing system, Secteur 30 
district, Burkina Faso 
The Janani Suraksha Yojana, for 
institutional deliveries. India 
Design features 
Date and 
geographic 
extent of 
implementati
on 
Started in 2005 in Secteur 30 district, 
Ouagadougou 
 
Started in 2005 - entire country. 1.1 billion 
population 
Beneficiaries All pregnant women living in the 
district 
Poor pregnant women (below poverty line) 
who have had 3 antenatal check-ups and 
delivered in a health facility. (Later changed 
to any delivery) 
Beneficiaries 
contribution 
A fixed rate 
25,000 FCFA (38.1 €) till September 
2006 
6,000 FCFA (9.1€) from 1st October 
2006 
Nil 
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What services 
are covered 
by the 
scheme?  
Only obstetrical emergencies (mainly 
c-section). Items included: transport, 
intervention, drugs, lab exams, post-
surgery care, hospital fee, new born 
care, dressings in OPD, post-natal 
consultation 
Institutional delivery. 
 
Subsequently, it was changed to ‘any delivery 
– not necessarily institutional delivery’ 
Which 
providers are 
eligible to 
participate? 
Secteur 30 district hospital Officially both public and private. In 
practice, only public practitioners were 
involved 
Funding 
arrangements 
Funded by health committees, district 
health team, government, local 
authorities 
Funding from budgetary allocations at the 
Central level 
Management 
of the 
scheme 
Management committee (hospital 
staff, district team, health committee, 
local authorities representatives) 
Meeting every trimester 
National, State, District level committees 
(comprising mostly of health staff). 
System for 
paying 
providers 
Funds transferred to district for one 
year based on the expected number of 
c-sections (2 to 3.5% of expected 
births) 
Providers were not paid any money for this. 
But village health workers who had 
motivated the mother for an institutional 
delivery received an incentive from the nurse 
Assessment of impact 
Impact on 
utilisation 
Facility based delivery: from 66.2% in 
2003 to 86.5% in 2007 
Population based C-section rate from 
2.5 to 3.7 % 
Apparently has increased the institutional 
deliveries. Some evidence that the Caesarean 
section is high. 
Impact on 
quality of 
care 
Improvement of quality but due to 
multidisciplinary activities (public 
health, anthropological, social 
mobilisation) 
Anecdotal evidence that the quality of care 
has reduced as the health facilities are not 
able to cope with the extra workload 
Impact on 
household 
costs/expend
itures 
No household survey done but 
qualitative survey indicates 
satisfaction of the patients for cost 
reduction and quality of care 
No evidence 
Impact on 
health 
outcomes 
No case of maternal mortality due to 
a lack of c-section but maternal 
mortality due to post-partum 
haemorrhage or severe anaemia 
persists.  
No evidence that maternal or neonatal 
deaths have reduced 
Impact on 
facilities 
Increasing workload but no increase 
of government budget for equipment 
and infrastructures (equipment gets 
quickly damaged with high workload) 
Increased workload without a corresponding 
increase in the resources.  
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Impact on 
health 
workers 
No direct impact on health workers 
income, though workloads increase. 
No incentives related to the scheme. 
Comfort: care immediately provided 
(C-Section performed prior to 
payment) 
Mixed response. Health staff feels that this is 
a good scheme to promote institutional 
deliveries. Some of the staff seems to benefit 
from it due to the informal fees that they 
charge. At the same time, they are unhappy 
about the high workload. 
Scheme’s 
performance 
in terms of 
equity 
Flat rate (6,000 FCFA) means that 
poor pay as much as rich people but 
indigents are exempted after social 
interview 
Utilisation still higher in urban than 
in rural area. 
While originally the scheme was for poor 
women, subsequently it was opened up for 
all women (especially in the poorer states). It 
is not clear who is now benefiting from the 
scheme, the better off or poor. Indicators for 
this are not being monitored. 
Adequacy 
and 
sustainability 
of funding 
Funding adequate as subvention is 
readjusted every year with the 
expected C-Sections  
Many stakeholders involved and 
contract to be negotiated every year. 
Need for a constant political 
mobilisation. 
Funds are not a problem. But there is an 
issue of fund flow to the periphery, resulting 
in women receiving the benefits after 
considerable delay. 
Cost/cost-
effectiveness 
of the 
scheme 
52 million FCFA for 2007 for the 
district of Secteur 30 (632 CS 
planned) 
Not established 
 
 
MURIGA (Community Health Insurance for Safe 
Motherhood) 
Obstetric Risk Insurance (ORI) in 
Mauritania  
Design features 
Date and 
geographic 
extent of 
implementati
on 
1997 : solidarity fund in the district of 
Dabola  
2006 : 17 districts out of 33 
17/11/2002 for 2 districts of Nouakchott    
11/05/2004 for a 3rd district of 
Nouakchott 
11/05/2005 for 3 regional capitals (Kiffa, 
Aioun, Néma) 
12/05/2007 for 1 regional capital (Aleg) 
1/03/2008 for rural areas of the 
department of Kiffa 
13/05/2008 for 3 regional capitals (Kaédi 
Nouadhibou) 
Beneficiaries All women of child-bearing age and 
children under five 
All pregnant women choosing this mode of 
payment 
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What services 
are covered 
by the 
scheme?  
-Ante Natal Care (ANC) (including 
medicines); delivery (including 
caesarean sections); obstetric 
complications (including hospital care 
and medicines); transportation costs 
in the event of referral to a higher-
level health facility  
Ante Natal Care (ANC) including biological 
testing and ultrasound; all types of delivery 
including caesarean section; post-natal care  
Which 
providers are 
eligible to 
participate? 
Existing public sector health facilities 
in the chosen catchment area. 
Public sector health facilities in the chosen 
geographical area 
Funding 
arrange-ments 
Premiums are paid by the households 
but international organisations and 
NGOs (UNICEF, World Bank, 
UNFPA, African Development Bank, 
USAID, etc.) supported the 
implementation phase of the 
MURIGA (meetings, transport). 
Some compensate the deficits, if any, 
at the end of the year.  
The scheme is funded by the contribution 
(pre-payment) of the households. 
Development partners (UNFPA, UNICEF, 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SCAC, 
AFD) supported the implementation phase 
of the scheme (financial and technical 
support) in the first years. 
Management 
of the scheme 
General Assembly of members who 
entrust the implementation of 
activities to an executive committee; 
the prefectural health team 
(Prefectural Director of Health, 
Director of Micro-realisations, 
Prefectural Director for the 
Advancement of Women). 
Batch of drugs supplied for the first six 
months then management autonomy, run 
by a local committee composed of 
beneficiaries and health staff members 
System for 
paying 
providers 
Receipts are paid into the rural credit 
bank and the service providers (care-
providers and union of transport 
workers) issue the MURIGA with an 
invoice. 
The monthly receipts are used to pay re-
supply of medicines and consumables plus 
duty personnel to cover emergencies 24/7; 
the balance is distributed as personnel 
bonuses  
Assessment of impact 
Impact on 
utilisation 
Little impact on assisted delivery rate 
(17% to 22% between 2000 and 
2006). C-Section rate rose from 0.75 
to 1.85% between 2000 and 2006 for 
the MURIGA areas versus 0.4 to 
1.6% for the areas without MURIGA 
Increase in the rate of assisted deliveries 
(61.5% in 2000 before the start of the ORI 
and 95.3% in 2007) in the 5 ORI maternity 
wards of Nouakchott 
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Impact on 
quality of 
care 
Beneficiaries have quicker access to 
care, but the MURIGA do not solve 
all the problems of bad management 
in health facilities, such as drug 
shortages, staff absenteeism, etc. , 
which explain the health services’ low 
utilisation rate. 
Significant improvement in the provision of 
emergency obstetric care in the 5 ORI 
facilities of Nouakchott (tripled rate of 
caesarean sections, with delay between 
indication and intervention reduced by 
three); no changes in daily care 
Impact on 
household 
costs/expend
iture 
Financial relief for the beneficiary 
families, but the enrolment rate is still 
low (about 10%) 
The rate fixed for the ORI is overwhelmingly 
supported by the users themselves. Even if 
there are still a few attempts to get unofficial 
payments; the women questioned cite the 
“price” as the biggest advantage. 
Impact on 
health 
outcomes 
No data available on the MURIGAs’ 
impact on maternal and neonatal 
mortality. 
No population data. Whether in the regions 
or in the 5 maternity wards offering ORI in 
Nouakchott, the participating facilities’ 
maternal mortality rate has halved on 
average.  
Impact on 
facilities 
In some hospitals, financial and 
technical support from the supporting 
institutions has enabled the 
MURIGA to set up new services and 
provide ambulances, radios, 
equipment and other supplies, as well 
as training for health staff. 
The hospitals display a certain hostility to 
the system. Their revenues have decreased 
following the introduction of the ORI - the 
income from obstetric activity is going 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, they no longer 
provide medicines or consumables and they 
receive bonuses that did not previously exist; 
Impact on 
health 
workers 
Some health managers feel that the 
MURIGA have made no real 
contribution.  
They are less satisfied than the users because 
they consider their bonuses insufficient, 
especially in the capital 
Scheme’s 
performance 
in terms of 
equity 
In principle, the system caters to the 
poorest women free-of-charge. There 
are no figures available to back this 
up. 
The constant increase in the number of 
enrolments seems to indicate that even the 
“poorest” can pay; very few “non-paid” fees 
have been recorded. 
Adequacy 
and 
sustainability 
of funding 
Most of the financial support for the 
strategy comes from development 
partners in the health sector. The 
contribution paid by beneficiaries and 
the benefits package are still globally 
low. Financial viability and autonomy 
are not yet guaranteed. Current 
interest from the Rural Development 
Communities (CRD) may well 
provide a source of local funding. 
The scheme can only be implemented in a 
region after the allocation of a working 
capital fund to cover six months of 
medicines and consumables.  
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 Bolivia’s health insurance packages 
Design features 
Date and 
geographic 
extent of 
implementati
on 
Nationwide 
1998: Seguro Nacional de Maternidad y Niñez (SNMN) 
2000: Seguro Básico de Salud (SBS) 
2002: Seguro Universal Materno Infantil (SUMI) 
Beneficiaries SNMN: pregnant women and children under 5 
SBS: pregnant women and children under 5 
SUMI: pregnant and puerperal women until 6 months after childbirth, women 15 to 
60 years for cervical cancer and family planning, children under 5 
What services 
are covered 
by the 
scheme?  
SNMN: Infant and child health problems (diarrhoea, cough) and obstetric care 
SUMI: 547 service packages, all illnesses with some exceptions. Medical consultation, 
laboratory, surgery, in-hospital care, drugs, supplies, nutritional supplements 
Which 
providers are 
eligible to 
participate? 
In theory public (Ministry of Health), public insurance, private and church/NGO 
providers. In practice only public, public insurances and some church providers, 
because SUMI reimbursement does not cover staff costs 
Funding 
arrangements 
National, departmental and municipal revenues 
Management 
of the scheme 
SUMI administration unit at national and departmental levels 
System for 
paying 
providers 
Administrative bill is prepared by the health facility and send to the municipality, 
which reviews it, records it in a database, debits the sum from the municipal account 
and credits it to the health centre’s account 
Impact of policy 
Impact on 
utilisation 
Institutional deliveries increased from 33% in 1996 to 64% in 2005 
Impact on 
quality of care 
Some decrease reported due to overcrowding of services 
Impact on 
household 
costs/expendi
tures 
Decrease, but no current data available 
Impact on 
health 
outcomes 
Maternal, infant, neonatal mortality reduced over period, which may be linked to the 
policy 
Impact on 
facilities 
No data available on financial impact on facilities 
Impact on 
health 
workers 
Increase in work. Some report more satisfaction.  
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Scheme’s 
performance 
in terms of 
equity 
Gaps in urban-rural and mestizo-indigenous coverage 
Adequacy 
and 
sustainability 
of funding 
Adequate and sustainable for the population covered 
Cost/cost-
effectiveness 
of the scheme 
No specific data available 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
